HG Vora filed a complaint against the casino operator and its board, alleging a breach of fiduciary duties when it cut the number of seats up for election this year from three to two.
In a letter to shareholders, PENN CEO Jay Snowden and Chairman David Handler acknowledged ESPN Bet “remains a key area of focus”, but that to date, the business hasn’t performed as expected.
HG Vora has issued a statement criticizing Penn Entertainment’s reduction of the number of board seats up for election at its 2025 annual meeting as an unlawful maneuver with no legitimate corporate basis that would prevent shareholders from exercising their full voting rights.
After Penn Entertainment announced it intended to shrink the board to eight directors, leaving only two seats available to be voted on at the annual meeting in June, HG Vora announced it plans to push ahead to try and elect all three of its director candidates to the board.
After signing a deal with sports betting giant Penn National in 2022, ESPN BET has floundered to a horrific market share of just 2.35 percent throughout the sports betting landscape.
HG Vora Capital Management has nominated three independent candidates for election to PENN Entertainment’s Board of Directors, citing underperformance and governance concerns as key reasons for the move.
HG Vora made the move it has been working toward, nominating three directors to take seats on the board of ESPN Bet parent company Penn Entertainment.
The New York-based investment firm HG Vora has nominated three director candidates to Penn Entertainment, accusing management of failing to help the group reach its “full potential”.
HG Vora has criticized the casino operator’s M&A history, share performance.
“PENN Entertainment (PENN) has posted its Q1 results this morning and while it will be defending that lackluster report today in the court of public opinion, it will also soon be defending itself in a different court. That is because a large holder HG Vora… alleges PENN violated Pennsylvania's Business Corporation Law when it hatched a scheme to deny HGV the third board seat it was seeking this proxy cycle. Almost certainly, HGV would have won that third seat if investors had been allowed to vote for its nominee. Rather than suffer the ignominy of being shut out, PENN chose to add two HGV nominees to the board, at the same time three directors are retiring. Because it decided to not fill the seat of the third retiree, there are only two names on this year's ballot and thus, HGV has been denied the opportunity to complete its Hat Trick.”
“Digital losses were more or less in-line; however, what matters above all else is how management addresses the broader Digital strategy on the call, given recent public acknowledgment that the prior strategy hasn't been as effective as planned. We believe some investors were expecting a strategic review announcement (for digital) coinciding with today's report, which is not present here”
“The Interactive segment reported $290.1M of revenue and an Adjusted EBITDA loss of $89M, lower than our revenue estimate of $319.4M and our estimated Adj. EBITDAR loss of $80.6M. Consensus expectations were $308.3M of revenue and an EBITDA loss of $86.6M, which implies modest downside to a widely dispersed consensus.”
“Interactive losses of $89m were more severe than our/Consensus expectations for $85m/$87m, which included a $10m impact from bad hold during March Madness (vs our expectation of $15m).”
“The ESPN Bet business appears to be narrowing its losses, line of sight to market share gains required to generate positive EBITDA remains unclear, in our view. We expect investors to focus on 1) strategic actions in Digital as share remains below targets outlined with the original agreement; and 2) details on the rebound in April/May given the heightened uncertainty around a consumer slowdown.”
“In the past two years, PENN shares are -30% given uninspiring financials plagued by competitive openings, low-end consumer pressure, high operating leverage, rising interest rates, and Interactive strategy changes. With ’24 results below expectations and elevated capex expected for one more year, FCF will remain suppressed this year.”
“[I]n our view, the uncertainty surrounding the Digital segment's market share and operating performance remains a key area of debate, which is a key driver of our tempered view… Although the core business performed a bit better than our expectations, the losses from the Interactive segment were weaker than our marginally optimistic estimates."
“Q4 EBITDA was above guidance, but missed our recently raised retail ests [sic] while 2025 retail guidance was generally in-line but Interactive was ~$100M worse than expected.”
“When discussing the overall trajectory of ESPN BET, PENN management was forthright in calling into question its current digital cost structure, and specifically highlighting its marketing spend (much of which goes to ESPN) in relation to ESPN BET currently being "not on pace" to compete for a podium position in market share, and also calling out next year's 3-year exit clause that becomes available to both parties. We're not sure how far away PENN and its board are from taking more drastic strategic action…”
“I don’t understand why people don’t understand that this CEO and Chairman are the most vulnerable executives I’ve ever seen. You all know the facts about the CEO’s comp vs performance score.”
“Simplistically, within interactive there are three components that together we estimate lost ~$520m in EBITDA in ’24(license fees, theScore, ESPNBet).”
“We believe there is significant opportunity to monetize/highlight/leverage those assets and lean into iGaming (a brand/product that has largely been conflated with OSB, leading to underwhelming results)[.]”
"As you all know, the main issue with the shares has been the company’s disastrous capital allocation track record since 2020 (pretty good before then) and their unflinching aspirations to continue to run head first into an expensive and unwinnable OSB market place…. We see virtually NO scenario that – at a minimum – new independent… directors don’t land on this board and lead to the inevitable “shut down” of the $4bn fantasy that netted $1 from Portnoy and hopefully $50mn in EBITDA in a good year.”
“PENN seemingly will lose $500mn in digital in 2024, they are a $3bn market cap company. The magnitude of their OSB losses is truly staggering.”
“Despite their best efforts to prevent it, PENN’s mgmt. team / board/ Chairman (a respected banker trying to build a new firm) now will face very hard questions in a public forum…for the first time ever.”
“This dissident slate was BY FAR the most important catalyst here… HG Vora’s directors are below. Compare those three to the 75, 77 and 79 year olds that PENN is putting up against them. You tell me who you think will win this contest…?”
“[W]e now believe PENN is one of the most interesting ‘event path’ stocks in our coverage... with an activist campaign(HG Vora) that could highlight under appreciated value and result in significant upside to the stock.”
“HG Vora will win this contest. We don’t need to belabor this point. I’ve spoken to almost every major shareholder. None are happy, how could they be? Vora’s… experienced candidates… will probably be viewed favorably against the PENN directors up for re-election[.]”
“Their nominees are people who know Penn, and many investors want people in there who know the business and can get things turned around here… I think HG Vora is in this for the long game[.]”
“I would imagine that there is some sense of agreement among larger shareholders that these directors will help drive Penn in the direction they want to go[.]”
“HG Vora’s nominees have significant transaction, M&A and capital return experience, potentially pointing to the direction they might want to take if elected."
“Vora has submitted about as impressive of a slate as you will ever see”
The information herein contains "forward-looking statements" that can be identified by the fact that they do not relate strictly to historical or current facts. Specific forward-looking statements can be identified by the fact that they do not relate strictly to historical or current facts and include, without limitation, words such as "may," "will," "expects," "believes," "anticipates," "plans," "intends," "estimates," "projects," "potential," "targets," "forecasts," "seeks," "could," "should" or the negative of such terms or other variations on such terms or comparable terminology. Similarly, statements that describe our objectives, plans or goals are forward-looking. Forward-looking statements are subject to various risks and uncertainties and assumptions. There can be no assurance that any idea or assumption herein is, or will be proven, correct. If one or more of the risks or uncertainties materialize, or if HG Vora’s underlying assumptions prove to be incorrect, the actual results may vary materially from outcomes indicated by these statements. Accordingly, forward-looking statements should not be regarded as a representation by HG Vora that the future plans, estimates or expectations contemplated will ever be achieved. The information herein does not constitute an offer to sell or solicitation of an offer to buy any of the securities described herein in any state to any person.
HG Vora and the other Participants (as defined below) filed a definitive proxy statement and accompanying gold universal proxy card with the SEC on May 12, 2025 to be used to solicit proxies for the election of its slate of director nominees at the 2025 annual meeting of shareholders (the “2025 Annual Meeting”) of PENN Entertainment, Inc. ("PENN").
The participants in the proxy solicitation are currently anticipated to be HG Vora Capital Management, LLC (the “Investment Manager”), HG Vora Special Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd. (“Master Fund”), Downriver Series LP – Segregated Portfolio C (“Downriver”), Parag Vora (“Mr. Vora” and, collectively with Investment Manager, Master Fund and Downriver, “HG Vora”), William Clifford, Johnny Hartnett , and Carlos Ruisanchez (collectively all of the foregoing, the “Participants”).
As of the date hereof, (i) Master Fund directly owns 3,825,000 shares of common stock, par value $0.001 per share (the “Common Stock”), of PENN, including 100 shares of Common Stock as the record holder and (ii) Downriver directly owns 3,425,000 shares of Common Stock, including 100 shares of Common Stock as the record holder (collectively, the 7,250,000 shares of Common Stock owned by Master Fund and Downriver, the “HG Vora Shares”). The HG Vora Shares collectively represent approximately 4.80% of the outstanding shares of Common Stock, based on the 150,852,769 shares of Common Stock outstanding as of April 24, 2025, as disclosed by PENN on its proxy statement for the Annual Meeting. The Investment Manager is the investment manager of Master Fund and Downriver, each of which have delegated all investment and voting decisions to the Investment Manager. Mr. Vora is the manager of the Investment Manager and has authority over day-to-day operations and investment and voting decisions, including with respect to the HG Vora Shares, of the Investment Manager. Each of the Investment Manager and Mr. Vora may be deemed to have the shared power to vote or direct the vote of (and the shared power to dispose or direct the disposition of) the HG Vora Shares and indirect ownership thereof. Mr. Ruisanchez directly owns 3,150 shares of Common Stock. Neither Mr. Clifford nor Mr. Hartnett beneficially own any shares of Common Stock. Certain of the Participants are also from time to time party to certain derivative instruments that provide economic exposure to PENN’s Common Stock. All of the foregoing information is as of the date hereof unless otherwise disclosed.
HG VORA STRONGLY ADVISES ALL SHAREHOLDERS OF THE CORPORATION TO READ THE DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT AND OTHER PROXY MATERIALS BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION. SUCH PROXY MATERIALS ARE AVAILABLE AT NO CHARGE ON THE SEC’S WEBSITE AT WWW.SEC.GOV. THE DEFINITIVE PROXY AND ACCOMPANYING PROXY CARD WILL ALSO BE FURNISHED TO SOME OR ALL OF THE COMPANY’S SHAREHOLDERS. SHAREHOLDERS MAY DIRECT A REQUEST TO THE PARTICIPANTS’ PROXY SOLICITOR, OKAPI PARTNERS LLC, 1212 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS, 17TH FLOOR, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036 (SHAREHOLDERS CAN CALL TOLL-FREE: (877) 629-6355).